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I. Introduction 
David Siller and Chen-Chen Wang were whistleblowers. 
Both men became aware of ongoing fraud in the course of their 
employment, and both alerted the authorities. Yet because of the 
sharply contrasting approaches taken by different federal 
circuits, one of these whistleblowers was rewarded, and one went 
away empty-handed.1 
David Siller worked for a health care products distributor in 
San Antonio, Texas. Siller learned that a large manufacturer was 
overcharging the government for its products and brought a qui 
tam2 whistleblower action under the False Claims Act (FCA).3 
The district court dismissed Siller’s claim because the allegations 
in Siller’s suit had already come to light in a previous lawsuit 
against the manufacturer. On appeal, however, the Fourth 
Circuit reversed, finding that because Siller had independent 
knowledge of the fraudulent activities, and because Siller had 
disclosed his information to the government before filing suit, he 
qualified as an “original source” under the FCA and thus could 
recover damages. 
Chen-Chen Wang was not so fortunate. Wang, a mechanical 
engineer for the FMC Corporation (FMC), noticed that FMC was 
defrauding the government on several defense contracts. Wang 
notified the U.S. government and filed suit under the FCA. The 
district court dismissed Wang’s claim, and the Ninth Circuit 
                                                                                                     
 1. The following scenarios are based on U.S. ex rel. Siller v. Becton 
Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1355 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that “a qui tam 
plaintiff need not be a source to the entity that publicly disclosed the allegations 
on which the qui tam action is based in order to be an original source under 
section 3730(e)(4)(B)”) and Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1420 (9th Cir. 
1992) (holding that “[b]ecause he had no hand in the original public disclosure of 
[fraud], Wang’s claim . . . is blocked by the jurisdictional bar of section 
3730(e)(4)(A)”). Both cases will be discussed in further detail. See infra text 
accompanying notes 126–69 (discussing one prong of a three-way circuit split).  
 2. The phrase “qui tam” is the legal shorthand for the Latin phrase qui 
tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which means “who 
pursues this action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his own,” and the 
phrase dates from at least the time of English jurist Sir William Blackstone. See 
Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 769 n.1 (2000) 
(defining the term). 
 3. See An Act to Prevent and Punish Frauds upon the Government of the 
United States, ch. 67, § 4, 12 Stat. 696 (1863) (current version at 31 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 3729–33 (West 2011)) (providing for civil actions for false claims).  
OPEN THE DOOR, NOT THE FLOODGATES 367 
affirmed the dismissal. Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the Ninth 
Circuit read a requirement into the FCA that when allegations of 
fraud have been made public, a qui tam plaintiff cannot recover 
damages unless the plaintiff was a source of the public disclosure. 
Since Wang knew of the fraud but did not file his complaint until 
others had publicized the corporation’s fraudulent actions, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the FCA’s “public disclosure” provision 
barred Wang’s suit. 
Siller and Wang are examples of qui tam relators—
whistleblowing private citizens who discover that the federal 
government is being defrauded and then file suit under the FCA. 
The FCA, which dates back to the Civil War, allows relators like 
Siller and Wang to share in the recovery of damages from 
dishonest contractors.4 Since the FCA’s enactment, Congress and 
the federal courts have sought to prevent both the under-
enforcement and the abuse of the statute, resulting in a 
tumultuous history that has swung between both extremes.5  
Both Siller and Wang encountered the FCA’s public 
disclosure bar and its original source exception. Yet because of 
the contrasting interpretations the Fourth and Ninth Circuits 
applied, Siller’s and Wang’s suits came to dramatically different 
conclusions. This Note reviews these dueling interpretations, as 
well as changes made to the FCA by the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA).6 This Note argues that the courts 
should narrowly construe the PPACA’s amendments in order to 
achieve the “golden mean” between valuable qui tam actions and 
parasitic, opportunistic litigation.7 Specifically, under the 
amendments, the term original source should apply to a relator 
who has either informed the government of his allegations before 
such information becomes public, or, in cases where the 
allegations are already in the public domain, the relator has 
valuable information which substantially assists the government.  
                                                                                                     
 4. See infra text accompanying notes 33–35 (discussing the background of 
the FCA). 
 5. See infra text accompanying notes 36–78 (noting various ways courts 
have handled the FCA). 
 6. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (providing for reforms to the U.S. health care system). 
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 218–59 (discussing the 2010 
amendments). 
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Part II examines the history of the FCA from its inception 
until the crucial 1986 amendments to the statute.8 Part III 
reviews the three-way circuit split over the proper interpretation 
of original source that developed after the 1986 amendments, as 
well as the PPACA amendments.9 Finally, Part IV considers the 
amendments made by the PPACA, using empirical evidence and 
the legislative history of similar provisions to argue that an 
original source under the FCA is a relator who has disclosed his 
information to the government prior to any public disclosure, or 
who has knowledge of fraud that would substantially assist the 
government’s case.10 
II. Background of the False Claims Act 
Congress sought to address fraudulent schemes like the ones 
David Siller and Chen-Chen Wang encountered by enacting the 
False Claims Act,11 a statute that allows charges to be brought 
against government contractors who submit false claims for 
payment to the federal government.12 This section first explains 
the origin and mechanics of the FCA.13 Next, this section reviews 
the extremes of abuse and disuse between which qui tam actions 
under the FCA have historically swung.14 Finally, this section 
considers key amendments to the FCA enacted in 198615 and 
2010.16  
                                                                                                     
 8. See infra text accompanying notes 11–89 (discussing the FCA’s history). 
 9. See infra text accompanying notes 90–217 (discussing the circuit split). 
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 218–59 (arguing for a narrow 
interpretation of the new definition). 
 11. See An Act to Prevent and Punish Frauds upon the Government of the 
United States, ch. 67, § 4, 12 Stat. 696 (1863) (current version at 31 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 3729–33 (West 2011)) (providing for civil actions for false claims).  
 12. Id.  
 13. See infra text accompanying notes 17–32 (discussing how the FCA 
works). 
 14. See infra text accompanying notes 36–78 (noting the extremes of over-
enforcement and disuse). 
 15. See infra text accompanying notes 79–203 (discussing the crucial 1986 
amendments to the FCA). 
 16. See infra text accompanying notes 204–17 (discussing the 2010 
amendments to the FCA). 
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A. The False Claims Act 
The FCA is one of the fastest-growing areas of federal 
litigation and is the federal government’s primary tool for 
catching companies who submit false claims to government 
agencies or programs.17 The stakes are high: In 2010, the United 
States Department of Justice, Civil Division, reported 
$3,080,446,526 in total fraud-related settlements and 
judgments.18 These judgments, of course, do not reveal the cost to 
the government of undetected fraud. Further, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, in enacting the crucial 1986 amendments 
to the False Claims Act, also noted the non-monetary harms 
resulting from fraud being perpetrated on the federal 
government: 
[Fraud] erodes public confidence in the Government’s ability to 
efficiently and effectively manage its programs. Even in the 
cases where there is no dollar loss—for example, where a 
defense contractor certifies an untested part for quality yet 
there are no apparent defects—the integrity of quality 
requirements in procurement programs is seriously 
undermined. A more dangerous scenerio [sic] exists where in 
the above example the part is defective and causes not only a 
serious threat to human life, but also to national security.19 
In order to combat fraud, the FCA relies substantially20 on 
qui tam actions, which allow a private citizen to bring suit on 
behalf of the federal government and to recover damages.21 The 
                                                                                                     
 17. See Joel D. Hesch, Understanding the “Original Source Exception” to 
the False Claims Act’s “Public Disclosure Bar” in Light of the Supreme Court’s 
Ruling in Rockwell v. United States, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 1, 1 (2008) 
(noting that the FCA is “the federal government’s primary anti-fraud tool for 
recovering ill-gotten gains from companies submitting false claims for payments 
to more than twenty government agencies or programs, such as Medicare and 
the military”).  
 18. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fraud Statistics—Overview, October 1, 1987–
September 30, 2010 (Jan. 10, 2011), www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C- 
FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2012) [hereinafter Fraud 
Statistics] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 19.  S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986) (citation omitted). 
 20. See id. at 2 (noting that “the Committee believes only a coordinated 
effort of both the Government and the citizenry will decrease this wave of 
defrauding public funds”). 
 21. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(d)(1) (West 2011) (providing that plaintiffs 
“shall . . . receive at least 15 percent but not more than 25 percent of the 
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FCA recognizes that the Attorney General of the United States 
has a responsibility to diligently investigate a violation under the 
statute, and that if the Attorney General finds that a person has 
violated or is violating the FCA, the Attorney General may 
prosecute the offender himself.22 Nevertheless, a private citizen 
“may bring a civil action for a violation of [FCA] section 3729 for 
the person and for the United States Government.”23 The action 
is brought in the name of the government and “may be dismissed 
only if the court and the Attorney General give written consent to 
the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.”24 The FCA also 
requires that a “copy of the complaint and written disclosure of 
substantially all material evidence and information the person 
possesses shall be served on the Government pursuant to Rule 
4(d)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”25 
The complaint must be originally filed in camera and is not 
disclosed to the defendant or the public for sixty days unless the 
court orders otherwise.26 The federal government, however, may 
elect to intervene, and, if it does, the government must “proceed 
with the action within 60 days after it receives both the complaint 
and the material evidence and information.”27 During this sixty-
day period, unless the government receives an extension, it must 
“proceed with the action, in which case the action shall be 
conducted by the Government,” or “notify the court that it 
declines to take over the action.”28 If this is the case, the private 
qui tam plaintiff “bringing the action shall have the right to 
conduct the action.”29 At that point, only the government may 
                                                                                                     
proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim, depending upon the extent to 
which the person substantially contributed to the prosecution of the action”).  
 22. See id. § 3730(a) (providing that if the Attorney General “finds that a 
person has violated or is violating section 3729, the Attorney General may bring 
a civil action under this section against the person”).  
 23. Id. § 3730(b)(1). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. § 3730(b)(2). 
 26. See id. (providing that the complaint “shall remain under seal for at 
least 60 days, and shall not be served on the defendant until the court so 
orders”). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. § 3730(b)(4). 
 29. Id. § 3730(b)(4)(B). 
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intervene or bring a related action based on those specific facts.30 
As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals noted in United States ex rel. 
Stinson v. Prudential Insurance Co.,31 the qui tam plaintiff may 
proceed unless information on which the plaintiff’s suit relies 
triggers one of the FCA’s jurisdictional bars.32 
B. The FCA’s Early History: From Disuse to Abuse 
Congress originally enacted the FCA during the Civil War, 
allowing private citizens to bring suit on the government’s 
behalf.33 Congress wanted to use “a rogue to catch a rogue”34 by 
inducing informers to betray their coconspirators, and the FCA’s 
qui tam provisions encourage relators to come forward by 
allowing them to receive from 15% to 25% of the recovery or 
settlement.35 
The FCA, however, was not heavily employed until the 1930s 
and 1940s, when the New Deal’s increase in government 
spending created the opportunity for contractors to defraud the 
government.36 Unfortunately, this renaissance of the FCA 
fostered parasitic litigation, with one of the most egregious 
                                                                                                     
 30. See id. § 3730(b)(5) (providing that no person “other than the 
Government may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts 
underlying the pending action”). 
 31. See U.S. ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1152 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (noting that a claim may proceed unless “information on which the 
claim is based triggers one of the jurisdictional bars contained in section 
3730(e)”).  
 32. See id. (noting that a claim may proceed unless “information on which 
the claim is based triggers one of the jurisdictional bars contained in section 
3730(e)”).  
 33. Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 4, 12 Stat. 698 (1863) (current version at 
31 U.S.C.A. §§ 3729–31 (West 2011)).  
 34. U.S. ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d 675, 679 
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 3D SESS. 955–56 (1863)). The 
opinion incorrectly cites pages 955–96. 
 35. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(d)(1) (West 2011) (noting that plaintiff shall 
“receive at least 15 percent but not more than 25 percent of the proceeds of the 
action or settlement of the claim”). 
 36. See Findley, 105 F.3d at 679 (noting that “increased government 
spending opened up numerous opportunities for unscrupulous government 
contractors to defraud the government”). 
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examples being United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess.37 In that 
case, the plaintiff, Marcus, claimed that several electrical 
contractors had defrauded the government.38 Marcus brought a 
qui tam action under the FCA,39 alleging that the contractors had 
an informal practice of averaging their prospective bids.40 A 
contractor chosen by the others would then submit a bid equal to 
that average but lower than the other contractors’ bids.41 Hence, 
the government was deceived into paying more for services than 
it would have paid otherwise. 
Marcus won in the district court.42 The Third Circuit, 
however—taking a strictly literal view of the FCA—reversed.43 
The Third Circuit emphasized that prior to Marcus’s action, the 
defendants had already faced an indictment for defrauding the 
government and had pled no contest.44 The Third Circuit agreed 
with respondents’ contention that Marcus had received his 
information, not from independent investigation, but from the 
existing indictment; hence he should not have been allowed to 
proceed with his qui tam action.45  
                                                                                                     
 37. See U.S. ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 553 (1943) (holding that 
qui tam relator could proceed with his suit and reversing appellate court). 
 38. See id. at 539 (noting that plaintiff charged “respondents with 
defrauding the United States through the device of collusive bidding”).  
 39. See id. (“[T]he petitioner in the name of the United States and on his 
own behalf brought this action under [§] 5438 (18 U.S.C.A. [§§] 80, 82–86), and 
[§§] 3490–3493 (31 U.S.C. [§§] 231–234, 31 U.S.C.A. [§§] 231–234), of the 
Revised Statutes.”).  
 40. See id. n.1 (describing that the “pattern of the collusion was the 
informal and private averaging of the prospective bid which might have been 
submitted by each appellant”).  
 41. See id. (“An appellant chosen by the others would then submit a bid for 
the averaged amount and the others all submitted higher estimates.”).  
 42. See id. at 540 (noting that “verdict and judgment for $315,000 were 
rendered against the defendants, of which $203,000 was for double damages and 
$112,000 was an aggregate of $2,000 sums for 56 violations”). 
 43. See id. at 540–41 (noting that the Third Circuit construed the statute 
“with ‘utmost strictness’ on the premise that qui tam or informer actions ‘have 
always been regarded with disfavor’ by the courts”). 
 44. See id. at 545 (noting that before the “filing of this action these 
respondents were indicted for defrauding the government and on a plea of nolo 
contendere were fined $54,000”). 
 45. See id. (noting that “the petitioner received his information not by his 
own investigation, but from the previous indictment” and hence the qui tam 
statute “should not under such circumstances be construed as permitting suit by 
the petitioner”).  
OPEN THE DOOR, NOT THE FLOODGATES 373 
The United States Supreme Court, in reversing the lower 
court, rejected both of these lines of reasoning. The Court found 
that not only did the statute apply in this instance46 but the 
plaintiff’s lack of independent knowledge of fraud did not bar his 
suit: “Even if, as the government suggests, the petitioner has 
contributed nothing to the discovery of this crime, he has 
contributed much to accomplishing one of the purposes for which 
the Act was passed.”47 The Court handled the statute strictly, 
noting that the text of the FCA was devoid of any limiting 
qualifications as to who may bring a private action.48 The Court 
also pointed out that the FCA’s sponsor in the Senate explicitly 
would have allowed even a district attorney, who would most 
likely gain all knowledge of a fraud from his official position, to 
pursue a qui tam action.49 The Court rejected the government’s 
policy arguments, finding that the government was relying on 
what Congress should have done, not what Congress did; the 
Court protested that its hands were tied by the statutory 
language.50 The Court believed that, while the government’s 
contentions had teeth, these arguments were best addressed to 
Congress—it was not the Court’s job to change the wording of the 
statute.51 For the Court, the fact that Congress passed this 
version of the FCA was clear and convincing evidence that 
Congress “concluded that other considerations of policy 
outweighed those now emphasized by the government.”52 
                                                                                                     
 46. See id. (“We conclude that these acts are covered by the statute under 
consideration.”).  
 47. Id.  
 48. See id. at 546 (“‘Suit may be brought and carried on by any person,’ 
says the Act, and there are no words of exception or qualification such as we are 
asked to find.”). 
 49. See id. (noting that the “sponsor of the bill explicitly pointed out that he 
was not offering a plan aimed solely at rewarding the conspirator who betrays 
his fellows, but that even a district attorney, who would presumably gain all 
knowledge of a fraud from his official position” could file).  
 50. See id. at 546–47 (“The government presses upon us strong arguments 
of policy against the statutory plan, but the entire force of these considerations 
is directed solely at what the government thinks Congress should have done 
rather than at what it did.”). 
 51. See id. at 547 (“[T]he trouble with these arguments is that they are 
addressed to the wrong forum. Conditions may have changed, but the statute 
has not.”). 
 52. Id. 
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Marcus fostered a dramatic increase in “parasitic” qui tam 
litigation, in which relators simply copied indictments or 
congressional investigations already in the public domain.53 Such 
suits served to diminish “the government’s ultimate recovery 
without contributing any new information.”54 
C. The Pendulum Swings Again: From Abuse to Disuse 
In the wake of the Marcus decision, Congress took up the 
Supreme Court’s invitation and amended the FCA to prune back 
excessive lawsuits.55 Thus, the FCA, as amended in 1943, barred 
qui tam suits that were “based upon evidence or information in 
the possession of the United States . . . at the time such suit was 
brought.”56 
Yet this correction of the opportunistic era represented by 
the Marcus decision sent the pendulum swinging too far in the 
other direction.57 This era is perhaps best exemplified by the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. 
Dean.58 In Dean, the State of Wisconsin brought charges against 
Alice Dean, a medical doctor, for submitting false claims for 
Medicaid reimbursements, and a state court found Dean guilty.59 
                                                                                                     
 53. See U.S. ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d 675, 
679–80 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that litigation “surged as opportunistic private 
litigants chased after generous cash bounties and, unhindered by any effective 
restrictions under the Act, often brought parasitic lawsuits copied from 
preexisting indictments or based upon congressional investigations”). 
 54. Id. at 680. 
 55. See id. (noting that Congress “finally took action to prevent such piggy-
back lawsuits”). 
 56. Id. (citing Act of December 23, 1943, 57 Stat. 608, recodified in 31 
U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) (1982) (superseded)).  
 57. See Todd J. Canni, Who’s Making False Claims, the Qui Tam Plaintiff 
or the Government Contractor? A Proposal to Amend the FCA to Require That 
All Qui Tam Plaintiffs Possess Direct Knowledge, 37 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1, 7 (2007) 
(“Where the original version of the FCA opened the door too wide, inviting all 
types of speculative suits, Congress ultimately realized that the 1943 
amendments effectively shut the door on qui tam suits.”).  
 58. See U.S. ex rel. Wis. v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100, 1106–07 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(holding that a state is not entitled to an exemption to the FCA’s requirements 
even when the state is under an obligation to report information to the federal 
government).  
 59. See id. at 1102 (“Defendant Alice R. Dean is a medical doctor who at 
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Subsequently, the Wisconsin Departments of Justice and Health 
and Social Services brought suit in federal district court against 
Dean under the FCA.60 The State of Wisconsin’s complaint 
alleged that Dean had submitted approximately 912 fraudulent 
claims for reimbursement over roughly a two-year period, and the 
suit sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, and 
costs.61 The Seventh Circuit, after laying out the requirements for 
qui tam actions under the FCA, noted that relators may maintain 
a qui tam action—even though the government declines to join—
unless it appears that the relator’s suit is based upon evidence or 
information the United States (or one of its agencies) already 
possesses at the time the suit is brought.62 
The federal government declined to join the action,63 and the 
district court found that information about Dean’s fraudulent 
claims was sufficiently in the government’s possession; the 
federal government was already able to adequately investigate 
the case and make a decision about whether to prosecute.64 Yet 
the district court, looking more toward the history and goals of 
the FCA, interpreted the FCA as allowing Wisconsin’s action to 
proceed.65 In reaching this conclusion, the district court 
“determined that the State of Wisconsin could maintain a qui tam 
action when the State was the source of ‘essential information’ 
                                                                                                     
one time practiced psychiatry in the Milwaukee area. In 1980, the defendant 
was found guilty in state court of making fraudulent claims for Medicaid 
reimbursements in connection with her medical practice.”). 
 60. See id. (noting that the government “filed suit in federal district court 
against the defendant under the False Claims Act”). 
 61. See id. (noting that the suit “alleged that the defendant submitted 
approximately 912 fraudulent claims for reimbursement for psychiatric services 
between March 1974 and February 1976” and demanded “compensatory 
damages on a pendent claim, $150,000 punitive damages, and costs”). 
 62. See id. (noting that plaintiff “may maintain the action even though the 
government declines to join unless ‘[it appears] that such suit was based upon 
evidence or information in the possession of the United States, or any agency, 
officer or employee thereof, at the time such suit was brought’”). 
 63. See id. (“The United States declined to join this action.”). 
 64. See id. at 1103 (noting that the district court “held that ‘the information 
upon which the instant case is based was sufficiently in the possession of the 
United States to enable the federal government to adequately investigate the 
case and make a decision whether to prosecute’”). 
 65. See id. (noting that the court “interpreted the legislative history of 
section 232(C) and denied [Dean’s] motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction”). 
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and when the State was required to provide such information to 
the federal government as part of its participation in the 
Medicare reimbursement program.”66 The district court reasoned 
that a contrary result would render the FCA ineffective.67 
The Seventh Circuit reversed.68 The court agreed that the 
federal government possessed adequate information as 
contemplated by the FCA,69 and thus any justification for 
allowing the State’s qui tam action to proceed must be grounded 
in an exception to the FCA’s plain language.70 Substantiating 
such an exception would require “a ‘clearly expressed legislative 
intention’ contrary to that language.”71 The district court 
concluded that the legislative history of the FCA did justify such 
an exception, but the Seventh Circuit sharply disagreed.72 The 
Seventh Circuit noted that the various courts which reviewed the 
FCA’s legislative history since the jurisdictional bar was added in 
1943 all refused to find an exception.73 The court also pointed out 
that while Congress’s immediate concern in enacting the 1943 
amendment was to combat parasitic litigation, the language and 
effect of the 1943 amendment was, in fact, much broader.74 
Further, the amendment itself was 
                                                                                                     
 66. Id. (emphasis added). 
 67. See id. (noting that a contrary result would “frustrate the purpose of 
Congress in protecting the United States against false claims”). 
 68. See id. (“We accepted jurisdiction and now reverse.”). 
 69. See id. at 1104 (noting that the “district court . . . properly determined 
that the government possessed adequate information as contemplated by section 
232(C)”). 
 70. See id. (describing a need for an “exception [that would] overcome the 
plain language of the False Claims Act”). 
 71. Id. (citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 
102, 108 (1980)).  
 72. See id. (noting that the district court “concluded that the legislative 
history of the Act was clear enough to overcome the statute’s unambiguous 
language” but that “[o]ur own review of the legislative history leads us to the 
opposite conclusion”).  
 73. See id. (finding that reviewing courts “all held that no exception 
exists”). 
 74. See id. (noting that while “Congress’s immediate concern in enacting 
the 1943 amendment was to do away with the ‘parasitical suits’ allowed by 
[Marcus], the language and effect of the 1943 amendment in fact is much 
broader”). 
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the result of a compromise between very different remedies 
proposed in each House of Congress. The House of 
Representatives passed a bill to completely abolish qui tam 
suits. The Senate, on the other hand, sought to allow qui tam 
actions if they were based either upon information not in the 
possession of the United States or upon information in the 
possession of the United States of which the qui tam plaintiff 
was the source. The compromise amendment allowed qui tam 
actions that the United States did not join to continue if the 
information was not in the possession of the United States at 
the time the action was brought, thereby incorporating only 
the first part of the original Senate proposal.75 
In other words, while the 1943 amendment countered 
parasitic lawsuits by establishing a jurisdictional bar for cases in 
which the United States government already possessed the 
information in question, the amendment provided no exception 
for cases in which the qui tam relator was himself (or itself) the 
original source of such information. Like the Supreme Court in 
Marcus,76 the Dean court handled the FCA very cautiously, 
reasoning that only rarely should a court find an exception to a 
statute when Congress has not explicitly provided one.77 The 
court refused to read the Social Security Act as providing an 
exception to the FCA and insisted that if Wisconsin “desires a 
special exemption to the False Claims Act because of its 
requirement to report Medicaid fraud to the federal government, 
then it should ask Congress to provide the exemption.”78 
                                                                                                     
 75. Id. at 1104–05 (emphasis added). 
 76. It is interesting that in providing its holding, the Seventh Circuit in 
fact cited Marcus. See id. at 1106–07 (“As the Supreme Court stated in United 
States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess . . . when it refused to create the jurisdictional bar 
that Congress later provided by the 1943 amendment to the False Claims 
Act . . . .”).  
 77. See id. at 1106 (“Only in the rarest instance will a court find an 
exception to a statute when Congress has not directly amended that statute.”) 
(citing Galvan v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 549 F.2d 281, 288 (3d Cir. 
1977)). 
 78. Id. 
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D. Striking a Balance: The 1986 Amendments 
In 1986, Congress provided such an exemption.79 The 1986 
amendments to the FCA included the “original source exception,” 
which changed the FCA to read:  
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this 
section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or 
transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in 
a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting 
Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news 
media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or 
the person bringing the action is an original source of the 
information.80 
If the 1943 amendment corrected decisions like Marcus, then 
the 1986 changes sought to remedy decisions like Dean.81 
According to the Report from the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
the amendments’ purpose was to strengthen the federal 
government’s ability to detect and combat fraud.82 The Senate 
lamented the recent spate of fraud cases83 and pointed out that 
such a flood of fraudulent activity necessitated modernization of 
the FCA.84 
The 1986 amendments sought not only to equip the 
government with better tools but also to encourage individuals 
with knowledge of fraud to alert the government.85 In the face of 
sophisticated and widespread fraud, the Committee believed that 
“only a coordinated effort of both the government and the 
citizenry [would] decrease this wave of defrauding public 
                                                                                                     
 79. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (West 2011) (providing for civil actions 
for false claims). 
 80. Id. (emphasis added). 
 81. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 13 (1986) (referring to the “unfortunate 
result of the Wisconsin v. Dean decision”). 
 82.  See id. at 1 (describing a need “to enhance the Government’s ability to 
recover losses sustained as a result of fraud against the Government”). 
 83. See id. at 2 (noting that “the recent proliferation of cases among some of 
the largest Government contractors indicates that the problem is severe”). 
 84. See id. (noting that the “growing pervasiveness of fraud” necessitated 
modernization of the FCA in order “to make the statute a more useful tool 
against fraud in modern times”).  
 85. See id. (describing the amendments’ purpose “not only to provide the 
Government’s law enforcers with more effective tools” but to “encourage any 
individual knowing of Government fraud to bring that information forward”). 
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funds.”86 As the First Circuit noted in United States ex rel. 
Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, the 1986 amendments 
sought to promote proper qui tam suits while discouraging 
opportunistic, parasitic litigation.87 The amendments repealed 
the “government knowledge” jurisdictional bar and replaced it 
with a provision that allows suits involving allegations of fraud 
that are already public when the qui tam relator is an original 
source of the information.88 Ironically, the Findley court noted, 
the 1986 amendments themselves have spawned new litigation 
and even circuit splits over the meanings of the amendments’ key 
terms, such as original source, direct and independent, and 
information.89 This Note turns next to the resulting circuit split 
regarding the definition of original source.  
III. Three-Way Circuit Split and Statutory Developments 
After Congress enacted the 1986 amendments to the FCA, a 
split developed among the United States Courts of Appeals over 
the proper way to interpret the original source exception to the 
FCA’s public disclosure bar for qui tam actions.90 As will be 
discussed below, the First and Fourth Circuits took what may be 
termed the “permissive approach,”91 while the Second and Ninth 
Circuits took a much more restrictive approach.92 In contrast to 
both of these views, the D.C. and Sixth Circuits staked out a 
                                                                                                     
 86. Id. 
 87. See U.S. ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d 675, 
680 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“After ricocheting between the . . . permissiveness that 
preceded the 1943 amendments and the extreme restrictiveness that followed, 
Congress . . . sought to achieve ‘the golden mean between adequate 
incentives . . . and discouragement of opportunistic plaintiffs . . . .’”). 
 88. See id. at 681 (noting that the amendments “repealed the ‘government 
knowledge’ jurisdictional bar” and allowed an exception when “the person 
bringing the action is an original source of the information”). 
 89. See id. (noting that the amendments “have led to extensive litigation 
and to circuit splits concerning the meaning of the words ‘based upon,’ ‘public 
disclosure,’ ‘allegations or transactions,’ ‘original source,’ ‘direct and 
independent knowledge’ and ‘information’”). 
 90. See U.S. ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 22 
(1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3454 (2010) (noting the circuit split). 
 91. See infra Part III.A (noting the permissive approach). 
 92. See infra Part III.B (discussing the restrictive view). 
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middle ground.93 Finally, the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act of 201094 altered the definition of original source under 
the FCA.95 
A. Permissive Approach 
In United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Products, 
L.P.,96 the First Circuit considered a qui tam suit brought against 
a pharmaceutical distributor, Ortho Biotech Products, L.P. 
(OBP).97 The qui tam relators alleged that OBP violated the FCA 
in unlawfully promoting the sale of one of its drugs.98 The 
original complaint charged that OPC had fraudulently 
manipulated the drug’s Average Wholesale Price99 and used free 
samples, rebates, and education grants to falsify their books.100 
Plaintiffs alleged that OBP used these tactics to lower the 
providers’ net cost.101 
The district court dismissed the complaint, and the qui tam 
relators appealed.102 On appeal, OBP and the government argued 
                                                                                                     
 93. See infra Part III.C (examining the “middle ground” approach). 
 94. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (providing for reforms to the U.S. health care system). 
 95. See infra text accompanying notes 204–17 (discussing the new 
amendments to the FCA). 
 96. See U.S. ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 21 
(1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3454 (2010) (finding that qui tam relator 
qualified as an original source). 
 97. See id. at 16 (noting that relators “alleged that defendant-appellee 
Ortho Biotech Products, L.P. (‘OBP’) violated the FCA in unlawfully promoting 
the sale of its drug Procrit”).  
 98. Id.  
 99. See id. at 17 (discussing “allegations concerning OBP’s fraudulent 
reporting of the Average Wholesale Price (‘AWP’) of [its drug] Procrit, a 
benchmark used by the Medicare program for reimbursement purposes”). 
 100. See id. (“[The complaint] also alleged that OBP provided ‘free samples’ 
of Procrit as well as ‘non-public financial inducements,’ such as rebates, 
discounts, ‘unrestricted education grants,’ and ‘phony drug studies.’”). 
 101. See id. (noting charges that OBP “further ‘inflate[d] the AWP,’ as ‘the 
value of these services was kept off the book [sic], so as not [to] be reflected in 
the AWP’”). 
 102. See id. at 19–20 (noting that “the district court allowed OBP’s motion to 
dismiss with prejudice and entered judgment in OBP’s favor” and that as “no 
claims survived, the district court dismissed the Amended Complaint with 
prejudice as to the Relators.”).  
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that the qui tam action should be dismissed under the FCA’s 
public disclosure bar; OBP contended that the statute required 
disclosure of the information to the government before the 
information became public.103 The First Circuit disagreed with 
OBP.104 The court rejected OBP’s contention that the FCA 
requires an original source to provide his or her information 
before the public disclosure at issue; instead, the court decided to 
“honor the plain and unambiguous terms of the statute” and held 
that § 3730(e)(4)(B) only requires that a relator provide his or her 
information prior to the filing of the qui tam suit.105 The First 
Circuit began with settled rules of statutory interpretation and 
considered whether the statute at issue was plain and 
unambiguous.106 To determine this, the court looked at the 
language itself, as well as the immediate context and the statute 
as a whole.107 The court noted that a literal reading of the FCA 
would only require relators to provide their information to the 
government before filing suit108 and that “the plain terms of [§] 
3730(e)(4)(B) begin and end the matter.”109 The court was not 
persuaded by the government’s contention110 that the definition 
of “source” in Black’s Law Dictionary should apply, and that this 
                                                                                                     
 103. See id. at 21 (noting the argument that “31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) 
requires a relator to provide the information to the government before the public 
disclosure itself, not just before the filing of the relator’s suit”). 
 104. See id. (“[W]e disagree, and conclude that the district court’s 
interpretation is the correct one.”).  
 105. Id. at 28. 
 106. See id. at 22 (“Although we are about to travel a well-trodden path, our 
first step remains the same. Our first step in interpreting a statute is to 
determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning 
with regard to the particular dispute in the case.”). 
 107. See id. (“The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is 
determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that 
language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”). 
 108. See id. (“By its terms, the ‘original source’ exception only requires the 
relator to ‘provide[ ] the information to the Government before filing an action 
under this section which is based on the information.’ Section 3730(e)(4)(B) does 
not impose any other timing requirement.”). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. (“The government argues that the language of § 3730(e)(4)(B), 
when read in context, supports its view.”).  
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definition requires an original source under the FCA to 
“originate” information.111  
The court refused to accept the government’s proffered 
definition of original source when the FCA already defined the 
term,112 noting that it is only when a statute fails to define a term 
that a court should fall back on the ordinary meaning.113 The 
court also refused to take into account Congress’s choice to use 
the term original source rather than engraft the definition found 
at § 3730(e)(4)(B) into (e)(4)(A).114 The court reasoned that had 
Congress wanted courts to use the plain meaning, it would have 
done so explicitly.115 
The court pointed to the structure of the FCA and defended 
its position against charges that it would encourage parasitic 
lawsuits, noting that the “first-to-file rule” already incentivizes 
whistleblowers not to delay their qui tam actions.116 The goal of 
the first-to-file rule is to provide qui tam relators an incentive to 
alert the government to fraudulent activity quickly, lest another 
relator steal their action’s legal thunder; the court saw no reason 
to pile further restrictions onto qui tam actions.117 According to 
the First Circuit, the Supreme Court’s decision in Rockwell 
International Corp. v. United States,118 which interpreted the 
                                                                                                     
 111. See id. (“[T]he government points to the meaning of the terms ‘original 
source’ itself, contending that a ‘source’ is defined as ‘[t]he originator or primary 
agent of an act, circumstance, or result.’ . . . Thus, a source cannot ‘originat[e]’ 
information that has been publicly disclosed.”).  
 112. See id. (declining to “rely upon the plain meaning of the terms ‘original 
source’ when the statute defines the term at § 3730(e)(4)(B)”).  
 113. See id. at 22–23 (“It is only ‘[w]hen a word is not defined by statute’ 
that we ‘construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning.’”). 
 114. See id. at 23 (declining to “attribute significance to Congress’s use of 
the terms ‘original source’ rather than engraft the definition found at 
§ 3730(e)(4)(B) into § 3730(e)(4)(A)”). 
 115. See id. (“Finally, had Congress intended to retain the plain meaning of 
‘original source’ and require relators to provide their information prior to the 
public disclosure, ‘it easily could have done so.’”).  
 116. See id. at 24 (noting that the rule “already provides potential relators 
significant incentive not to sit on the sidelines”). 
 117. See id. (“It is unclear why a relator would wait for a public disclosure 
and risk another relator bringing suit.”).  
 118. See Rockwell Intern. Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 476 (2007) 
(holding that the relator “did not have direct and independent knowledge of the 
information upon which his allegations were based”).  
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FCA’s “direct and independent” knowledge requirement, 
undercut the government’s argument119 because in addressing 
the meaning of the FCA’s direct and independent knowledge 
requirement, the Supreme Court also addressed the term 
information, holding that the term refers to the information 
behind the relator’s claim, not the information behind the public 
disclosure.120  
The First Circuit also held that the FCA’s tumultuous history 
supported its position.121 Congress had amended the FCA 
specifically to encourage more private qui tam actions, noting 
that such actions may be useful and lucrative even when certain 
allegations of fraud have already been made public.122 The 1986 
amendments, after all, were designed to remedy the extreme 
restrictiveness of the Dean decision.123 The First Circuit rejected 
any reading of the FCA that would discourage productive 
whistleblower suits from proceeding, even if such permissiveness 
allowed a few parasitic qui tam actions to creep into the docket.124 
The First Circuit feared that the reading suggested by OBP and 
the government (as well as by the D.C. and Sixth Circuits) would 
                                                                                                     
 119. See U.S. ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 24 
(1st Cir. 2009) (stating that Rockwell “substantially undercuts the conclusion by 
the D.C. and Sixth Circuits that ‘little incentive’ is necessary for suits brought 
after a public disclosure”).  
 120. See id. (“[T]he Rockwell Court . . . addressed the meaning of the term 
‘information’ . . . [and held] that ‘information’ for purposes of both 
subparagraphs refers to the ‘information underlying the allegations of the 
relator’s action,’ not the information underlying the public disclosure.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 121. See id. at 27 (noting that “the 1986 amendments equally sought to end 
a regime that resulted in the ‘under-enforcement’ of the FCA, one that rested too 
much on government notice to prevent fraud”). 
 122. See id. (noting that there “may arise situations when . . . the 
government would benefit from suits brought by relators with substantial 
information of government fraud even though the outlines of the fraud are in 
the public domain”). 
 123. See id. at 26 (noting that the Dean court held that if relators want a 
special exemption to the FCA’s public disclosure bar, they “should ask Congress 
to provide that exemption” and that “Congress obliged, and in 1986 Congress 
amended the FCA to ‘encourage more private enforcement suits’”). 
 124. See id. at 27 ( “[W]e have rejected readings of the ‘public disclosure’ bar 
that ‘would create a new exclusion not articulated in the text’ which would 
discourage ‘productive private enforcement.’”). 
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jeopardize the 1986 amendments and return the courts to the 
government-knowledge bar of the Dean era.125  
In United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co.,126 
the Fourth Circuit articulated a similar position, stating that a 
relator “having direct and independent knowledge of the 
information on which the allegations in the public disclosure is 
based” need only “provide his information to the government 
before instituting his qui tam action, as the provision 
unambiguously states.”127 In Siller, the qui tam plaintiff alleged 
that a medical device distributor defrauded the government, and 
the plaintiff filed an action in 1991,128 but not before similar 
charges came to light in another case.129 The district court held 
that Siller did not qualify as an original source.130 The Fourth 
Circuit, however, rejected this approach,131 holding that such an 
outlook rested on a misreading of the FCA’s legislative history.132 
The Fourth Circuit viewed the Second Circuit’s reading of the 
FCA’s text and legislative history as “not merely unpersuasive, 
                                                                                                     
 125. See id. (“[W]e rejected an interpretation . . . [that included disclosures 
made only to the government], as it would ‘reinstate exactly what Congress 
eliminated . . . .’ Although the reading urged here would not return us to the 
‘government notice’ regime, it [would bar] ‘productive private enforcement 
suits.’” (citation omitted)).  
 126. See U.S. ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1355 
(4th Cir. 1994) (holding that “a qui tam plaintiff need not be a source to the 
entity that publicly disclosed the allegations on which the qui tam action is 
based in order to be an original source under section 3730(e)(4)(B)”).  
 127. Id. 
 128. See id. at 1341 (“David Siller filed the instant qui tam suit against BD 
in January 1991. According to Siller, [Siller] originally learned that BD 
overcharged the government through his employment with SSI, not as a result 
of SSI’s suit against BD.”). 
 129. See id. (“In 1989, SSI filed suit against BD. . . . The thrust of [the] 
complaint was that BD canceled SSI’s distributorship because it feared that 
SSI . . . would disclose that BD was overcharging the government.”).  
 130. See id. at 1351 (noting that “Siller was not an ‘original source’ within 
section 3730(e)(4)’s exception to its jurisdictional bar”). 
 131. See id. (“We reject the Second Circuit’s standard, and the district 
court’s adoption of that standard, as imposing an additional, extra-textual 
requirement that was not intended by Congress.”).  
 132. See id. at 1352 (“We believe that, in truth, the Second Circuit’s 
conclusion that a putative plaintiff must provide his information to the 
disclosing entity in order to be an original source rests not upon the statutory 
language, but entirely upon a reading, and misreading, of the legislative 
history.”). 
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but implausible.”133 The court held that the Second Circuit’s 
interpretation of § 3730(e)(4) of the FCA, which read the FCA as 
requiring the plaintiff to provide his information to the disclosing 
entity, is foreclosed by the definition of original source in 
subparagraph (B).134  
The Fourth Circuit found the Second Circuit’s view to be not 
only a misreading of the FCA’s legislative history but also a 
misuse of this history to read ambiguity where no ambiguity 
existed.135 The Second Circuit relied heavily on comments by 
Senator Grassley during the debate over the 1986 amendments, 
and if the enacted language had matched the proposed language 
at the time of Senator Grassley’s comments, the Second Circuit 
might have a point.136 Yet the version of the amendments on 
which Senator Grassley commented was later changed in two 
significant respects.137 First, the requirement that an original 
source under the FCA inform the media was dropped from the 
amendments’ final language; given that the media is specified in 
other parts of the final language, the fact that Congress deleted 
the words “the media” from the original source requirements is 
instructive.138 Second, the amendments ultimately required only 
that an original source had to inform the government “before 
filing” an action—not before the government filed an action.139 
                                                                                                     
 133. Id. at 1351. 
 134. See id. (“The Second Circuit’s interpretation . . . might at least be 
tenable were there not a definition of ‘original source’ in sub-paragraph (B). . . . 
Sub-paragraph (B) . . . sets forth [what] the Second Circuit holds it does 
not . . . .”). 
 135. See id. at 1352 (“In fact, the Second Circuit’s decision is a classic 
example of the use of legislative history to create an ambiguity in the statute 
where none exists in order to justify use of that history as dispositive evidence of 
congressional intent.”). 
 136. See id. at 1353 (“If the provision . . . had been enacted as it existed at 
the time Senator Grassley made the comment, the comment would be some 
evidence of a congressional intent supporting the Second Circuit’s 
interpretation, although even then we would not permit [it] to override [clear] 
statutory language . . . .”).  
 137. See id. (“In fact, however, the version of the legislation addressed by 
Senator Grassley was changed in two significant respects.” (footnote omitted)).  
 138. See id. (noting that “Congress deleted ‘the media’ as a party whom the 
original source was required to inform” and that “Congress presumably would 
not have deleted the media from the ‘original source’ definition . . . if it intended 
to require the plaintiff to provide his information to the disclosing entity”).  
 139. See id. (“Second, Congress ultimately provided that an original source 
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Indeed, if Congress had intended relators to be a source to the 
disclosing entity, Congress would not have allowed relators to 
provide their information after the public disclosure.140 These 
changes in language from the amendments’ proposed language to 
their final form suggest that, even if Congress had considered 
requiring relators to be a source to the disclosing entity in order 
to qualify as an original source, Congress ultimately chose not to 
codify such a requirement.141 In sum, then, according to the First 
and Fourth Circuits, qui tam relators must voluntarily provide 
their information to the government only before filing their 
actions; no other timing requirements apply.  
B. Restrictive Approach 
The Second Circuit also weighed in on the debate. In United 
States ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co.,142 the Second 
Circuit considered a qui tam action brought by managers of a 
nuclear power plant.143 The managers filed an action under the 
FCA,144 charging that the Long Island Lighting Co. (LILCO) had 
deceived the state’s Public Service Commission about the plant’s 
construction status, essentially cheating the government.145 
                                                                                                     
had to inform the government only ‘before filing [his qui tam] action,’ as opposed 
to ‘prior to an action filed by the Government.’”). 
 140. See id. (“It would be odd, if Congress had intended a plaintiff to be a 
source to the disclosing entity in order to be an ‘original source,’ for it to have 
allowed the plaintiff to provide his information after the public disclosure . . . .”). 
 141. See id. (“These two changes suggest that, even assuming that Congress 
may at one point have intended a plaintiff to be a source to the disclosing entity 
to be an original source, which is anything but clear, it ultimately chose not to 
enact such a requirement into law.”). 
 142. See U.S. ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 18 (2d 
Cir. 1990) (holding that “if the information on which a qui tam suit is based is in 
the public domain, and the qui tam plaintiff was not a source of that 
information, then the suit is barred”). 
 143. See id. at 14 (noting an action by “mid-level managers at the Shoreham 
Nuclear Power Station”). 
 144. See id. (noting that the managers “were aware of the construction 
status of Shoreham” and that “they filed a complaint against the Long Island 
Lighting Co. (‘LILCO’), certain of its executives (collectively, the ‘LILCO 
defendants’), and Stone & Webster Engineering Corp.”).  
 145. See id. (discussing deception about the “construction status of 
Shoreham” and LILCO’s allegedly obtaining “higher rates and defrauding the 
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However, almost sixteen months earlier, New York’s Suffolk 
County had filed an action against LILCO for violations of the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),146 
and this RICO action had garnered significant publicity.147  
The court noted that, while the appellants’ later-filed 
complaint included some new factual allegations, on the whole 
the complaint “was fairly characterized by the district judge as a 
copy of [Suffolk County’s] earlier complaint.”148 The court 
disagreed that relators were original sources, reasoning that in 
addition to voluntarily providing their information to the 
government before filing their actions, true original sources must 
also be a source of the initial leak.149 The court based this 
conclusion on a close reading of the text and its legislative 
history.150 The court also noted that the purpose of the FCA “is to 
encourage private individuals who are aware of fraud being 
perpetrated against the government to bring such information 
forward,”151 and reasoned that its interpretation harmonized with 
this purpose and was “most likely to bring ‘wrongdoing to light’ 
since, by barring those who come forward only after public 
disclosure of possible [FCA] violations from acting as qui tam 
plaintiffs, it discourages persons with relevant information from 
remaining silent and encourages them to report such information 
at the earliest possible time.”152 
Like the First Circuit in Duxbury, the Second Circuit began 
with the FCA’s legislative history, stating that the court’s role is 
                                                                                                     
United States as a ratepayer”). 
 146. See id. (noting that the county “had commenced a putative class action 
against the LILCO defendants, alleging in its complaint violations of the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act . . . leading to the rate 
overcharges” (citation omitted)). 
 147. See id. (noting that the action “was widely reported in the news media, 
especially in the Counties of Nassau and Suffolk”). 
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. at 16 (finding that “there is an additional requirement that a qui 
tam plaintiff must meet in order to be considered an ‘original source,’ namely, a 
plaintiff also must have directly or indirectly been a source to the entity that 
publicly disclosed the allegations on which a suit is based”). 
 150. See id. (describing a “close textual analysis combined with a review of 
the legislative history”). 
 151. Id. at 18. 
 152. Id. 
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to discern congressional intent.153 The court noted that two 
legislators—both heavily involved in the passage of the 1986 
amendments—had spoken at length regarding the meaning of the 
term original source.154 Representative Berman, a codrafter of the 
legislation, defined an original source as someone who “had some 
of the information related to the claim which he made available 
to the government or the news media in advance of the false 
claims being publicly disclosed.”155 In the same vein, Senator 
Grassley, who introduced the legislation in the Senate, stated 
that the FCA barred a relator who had not been a source to the 
entity that disclosed the allegations.156  
The Second Circuit noted that if § 3730(e)(4)(B) contained the 
exclusive requirements that a qui tam plaintiff must satisfy to be 
an original source, Senator Grassley’s and Representative 
Berman’s statements would make little sense.157 However, if 
subsection (4)(A) is construed to hold an additional requirement 
that a relator must meet to be considered an original source, 
namely, that the relator must have been a source to the entity 
that first leaked or disclosed the allegations of fraud, the 
legislative history is more coherent.158 In short, the Second 
Circuit found that, for cases in which allegations of fraud are in 
the public domain, and the qui tam plaintiff is not a source of 
such information, then the plaintiff’s suit is barred.159  
                                                                                                     
 153. See id. at 17 (noting that “our fundamental task in interpreting a 
statute is ‘to give effect to the intent of Congress’” and that “we look to the 
legislative history for evidence of Congress’s intent” (citing United States v. Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940))). 
 154. See id. (“Two legislators who appear to have been the most involved 
with the Act’s development and passage spoke at length regarding the meaning 
of ‘original source.’”).  
 155. Id. (citing 132 CONG. REC. H9389 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986)). 
 156. See id. (noting that a relator would be barred “‘who had not been an 
original source to the entity that disclosed the allegations’ from bringing a qui 
tam claim based on publicly disclosed information”). 
 157. See id. (noting that if (4)(B) “contained the exclusive requirements that 
a qui tam plaintiff must satisfy to be an ‘original source,’ these legislators’ 
statements would be somewhat inexplicable”).  
 158. See id. (noting that legislative history makes “much [more] sense if 
[paragraph] (4)(A) contains an additional requirement . . . namely, that to be 
considered an ‘original source,’ one must have been a source to the entity that 
first publicly disclosed the information on which a suit is based”). 
 159. See id. at 18 (“In sum, for the reasons stated hereinabove, we believe 
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The Ninth Circuit cited Dick and articulated the same 
approach in Wang v. FMC Corp.160 Wang is very similar to Dick; 
both cases come to the same conclusion. The plaintiff in Wang 
was fired from his job at the FMC Corporation, a defense 
contractor, and later filed several claims.161 Among these claims 
was a qui tam action alleging that the corporation had defrauded 
the government.162 The Ninth Circuit, like the Second Circuit, 
relied on legislative history and found that the FCA extends qui 
tam jurisdiction only to those who had participated in the public 
disclosure of the allegations in the first place.163 The court also 
considered public policy, noting that the paradigmatic qui tam 
plaintiff is the “whistleblowing insider.”164 Qui tam suits are 
meant to encourage those with inside information to blow the 
whistle on fraudulent practices, and “[i]n such a scheme, there is 
little point in rewarding a second toot.”165 Since Wang, like Dick, 
was not a true original source, Wang was forced to withdraw from 
the action.166   
To put it another way, if a plaintiff simply republishes 
charges that are already in the public domain, the Second and 
Ninth Circuits barred such a relator from bringing a qui tam 
action.167 The court made its point forcibly: “A ‘whistleblower’ 
                                                                                                     
that if the information on which a qui tam suit is based is in the public domain, 
and the qui tam plaintiff was not a source of that information, then the suit is 
barred.”). 
 160. See Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1420 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding 
that “[b]ecause he had no hand in the original public disclosure of [fraud], 
Wang’s claim . . . is blocked by the jurisdictional bar of section 3730(e)(4)(A)”).  
 161. See id. at 1415 (“Wang was fired from his job at FMC on December 11, 
1986. He filed this action a year later, on December 10, 1987. In addition to his 
False Claims Act claim, Wang joined a number of state law claims, including a 
wrongful termination claim.”). 
 162. See id. (noting Wang’s allegation that “FMC defrauded the Government 
in four separate projects”). 
 163. See id. at 1418 (relying on the “history of the False Claims Act and the 
legislative history of its most recent amendment make clear that qui tam 
jurisdiction was meant to extend only to those who had played a part in publicly 
disclosing the allegations and information on which their suits were based”). 
 164. Id. at 1419. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 1418. 
 167. See id. at 1419 (finding that such relator “cannot bring a qui tam suit, 
even if he had ‘direct and independent knowledge’ of the fraud”). 
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sounds the alarm; he does not echo it.”168 Public policy also 
dictates that plaintiffs should be incentivized to reveal fraud; the 
government’s goal is to reward those who bring wrongdoing to 
light, and any bounty that results from such action should go to 
those relators.169 
C. Middle-Ground Approach 
In contrast to the view of the First and Fourth Circuits—
which allowed qui tam plaintiffs to proceed as long as they 
voluntarily provided their information to the government before 
filing their actions—and the view of the Second and Ninth 
Circuits—which barred qui tam suits in which the plaintiff was 
not the source of any public disclosure—the D.C. and Sixth 
Circuits carved out a third option.170 
In United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ 
Club,171 the qui tam relator alleged that government employees’ 
clubs, which earned revenue from vending services, kept money 
owed to the government.172 The district court, however, found 
that the same fraudulent practice of government employees’ clubs 
retaining vending machine income was widely known at the time 
the action was brought, and the court dismissed the case in 
                                                                                                     
 168. Id. 
 169. See id. at 1420 (“While Wang was silent, some other conscientious or 
enterprising person bravely brought the transmission problems to the attention 
of the media and the Army. If there is to be a bounty for disclosing those 
troubles, it should go to one who in fact helped to bring them to light.”). 
 170. See U.S. ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d 675, 
691 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that “[r]elator Findley cannot qualify as an 
‘original source’ because he had no knowledge of any of the essential elements of 
the publicly disclosed fraudulent transactions prior to their public disclosure”); 
U.S. ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 943 (6th Cir. 
1997) (holding that “the relator must provide the government with the 
information prior to any public disclosure”). 
 171. See Findley, 105 F.3d at 691 (holding that “[r]elator Findley cannot 
qualify as an ‘original source’ because he had no knowledge of any of the 
essential elements of the publicly disclosed fraudulent transactions prior to 
their public disclosure”). 
 172. See id. at 678 (discussing allegations that “government employees’ 
clubs that earn revenue from vending services on federal property [were] 
violating the False Claims Act . . . by retaining monies owed to the 
government”). 
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reliance on the FCA’s jurisdictional bar.173 The D.C. Circuit, 
using the language, structure, history, and purpose of the FCA, 
concluded that the FCA’s public disclosure bar should only allow 
suits in which the relator played a role in making new 
discoveries; since Findley was not such a relator, the court held 
that his suit was barred.174  
The court agreed with the Fourth Circuit’s rejection of the 
strict approach articulated by the Second Circuit and the Sixth 
Circuit.175 To qualify as an original source, a relator must simply 
have provided information to the government before filing the 
suit.176 The court added that “the statute only contemplates an 
‘original source’ being a ‘source’ to the government.”177 A person 
who provided information to the government should be able to 
bring his suit; it should not matter that the relator’s information 
was subsequently uncovered by, for example, the news media.178 
Yet the D.C. Circuit differed from the Fourth Circuit in one 
key respect, finding that a true original source must, essentially, 
outrace the public disclosure.179 The court conceded that 
subparagraph (B), considered in isolation, seems to imply that an 
original source need only have direct and independent knowledge; 
the court, however insisted that subparagraphs (A) and (B) must 
be read in conjunction.180 The court found it significant that 
                                                                                                     
 173. See id. (“[T]he practice of government employees’ clubs retaining 
vending machine income was widely known at the time this action was brought 
and dismissed the case in reliance on the Act’s jurisdictional bar against qui tam 
suits that are ‘based upon the public disclosure of allegations or 
transactions . . . .’”). 
 174. See id. (“[T]he public disclosure bar . . . limits qui tam jurisdiction to 
those cases in which the relator played a role in exposing a fraud of which the 
public was previously unaware.”). 
 175. See id. at 690 (“[T]here is no additional requirement that the ‘original 
source’ be responsible for providing the information to the entity that publicly 
disclosed the allegations of fraud.”). 
 176. See id. (noting that relator must have “‘voluntarily provided the 
information to the government’ before filing a qui tam suit”). 
 177. Id. 
 178. See id. (“A person who provided information to the government that 
subsequently was uncovered by a reporter and printed in the newspaper, would 
still be able to maintain a qui tam action.”). 
 179. See id. (noting that relator “must provide the government with the 
information prior to any public disclosure”). 
 180. See id. (“Standing on its own, subparagraph (B) suggests that an 
‘original source’ need only have direct and independent knowledge of the 
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Congress chose to use the term original source rather than 
incorporate subparagraph (B)’s description into subparagraph 
(A); the court reasoned that this choice reflected a requirement 
that an original source provide the information to the government 
before the information becomes public.181 “Once the information 
has been publicly disclosed,” the D.C. Circuit reasoned, “there is 
little need for the incentive provided by a qui tam action.”182 In 
Findley’s case, the relator conceded that he did not know about 
the public disclosures of fraud but rather learned of the practices 
of the FPC-Boron Employees’ Club at a later date.183 Because the 
fraudulent schemes that Findley observed were made public 
before Findley even knew of them, the court found that Findley 
could not qualify as an original source.184 
The qui tam relator in United States ex rel. McKenzie v. 
BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.185 was an employee of South 
Central Bell, a BellSouth subsidiary, who became concerned that 
her employer was defrauding the government by falsifying repair 
information for telephone lines used by BellSouth’s government 
customers.186 McKenzie did not sit passively by; she complained 
                                                                                                     
allegations in the qui tam complaint. The two subparagraphs must be read 
together, however, in order to divine Congress’ real intent.”).  
 181. See id. at 691 (“[T]he only reading of the statute that accounts for . . . 
Congress’ decision to use the term ‘original source’ rather than simply 
incorporating subparagraph (B)’s description . . . is one that requires an original 
source to provide the information to the government prior to any public 
disclosure.”). 
 182. Id. 
 183. See id. (“[Relator] stated that he was unaware of the public disclosures 
that we relied on in determining that the jurisdictional bar has been triggered 
and that he learned of the practices of the FPC-Boron Employees’ Club [at a 
later date].”). 
 184. See id. (finding that because the “employees’ groups’ questionable 
transactions were publicly disclosed . . . before Findley even became aware of 
the practices, he cannot qualify as an original source who is exposing essential 
elements of a fraudulent transaction that have not previously been publicly 
disclosed”). 
 185. See U.S. ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 
943 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that “the relator must provide the government with 
the information prior to any public disclosure”). 
 186. See id. at 937 (noting that “McKenzie was an employee of BellSouth’s 
subsidiary, South Central Bell, from December 1966 until March 1992,” and 
that according to McKenzie’s complaint, “South Central Bell, to avoid having to 
make refunds to the United States and other customers, falsified trouble 
reports”). 
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to her supervisors about these practices in 1984 and continued to 
complain until she left the company.187 After bringing her 
concerns to light, McKenzie felt harassed and claimed that the 
company threatened to dismiss her.188 After McKenzie suffered 
two emotional breakdowns, a company psychiatrist placed 
McKenzie on leave, prompting McKenzie to bring suit.189 The 
district court, however, dismissed the complaint for lack of 
jurisdiction.190 
The Sixth Circuit reviewed the dismissal with an eye toward 
whether the FCA, particularly the 1986 amendments, justified 
jurisdiction over McKenzie’s suit.191 The district court, noting 
that McKenzie’s allegations were based upon public disclosures, 
found that she would need to qualify as an original source in 
order to proceed.192 After reviewing the approaches of other 
circuits, including the position offered by the D.C. Circuit in 
Findley, the court noted that a plaintiff cannot “be a ‘true 
whistleblower’ unless she is responsible for alerting the 
government to the alleged fraud before such information is in the 
public domain.”193 The court then adopted the approach of the 
D.C. Circuit and concluded that to be an original source, a relator 
must bring fraud to the government’s attention before knowledge 
of the fraud has been publicly disclosed.194  
The Sixth Circuit reached its conclusion by examining 
congressional purpose, as well as the plain meaning of the 
                                                                                                     
 187. See id. (noting that McKenzie “began complaining to her supervisors at 
South Central Bell about these practices in 1984 and continued to complain 
until she left her position on disability status”). 
 188. See id. (noting that relator claimed to have been “threatened with 
discharge”). 
 189. See id. (noting that “a company psychiatrist placed McKenzie on 
permanent disability leave” and that McKenzie “filed suit under the FCA”). 
 190. See id. (noting that the district court “dismissed McKenzie’s complaint 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FCA”). 
 191. See id. at 938 (noting that the court examined “whether the 1986 
amendments [to the FCA] extend jurisdiction to include McKenzie’s suit”). 
 192. See id. at 941 (noting that the court “determined that McKenzie’s 
allegations were based upon public disclosures” and so she “must have been an 
‘original source’ for the district court to have jurisdiction over her action”). 
 193. Id. at 942. 
 194. See id. (“[T]o be an original source, a relator must inform the 
government of the alleged fraud before the information has been publicly 
disclosed.”). 
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FCA.195 The court considered the FCA’s history prior to the 1986 
amendments and noted the two extremes of Marcus and Dean to 
which judicial interpretations of the FCA had swung.196 The 
Sixth Circuit believed its interpretation of the phrase original 
source was consistent with the FCA’s purpose and more likely 
than other views to expose new allegations of fraud because, by 
barring relators who file after a public disclosure, the Sixth 
Circuit’s view would discourage potential relators from keeping 
quiet.197 The court also reasoned that its approach furthered 
another goal of the FCA—preventing parasitic qui tam actions.198 
The Sixth Circuit, like the D.C. Circuit, wanted to reward the 
true whistleblower, not the plaintiff who watches others make 
allegations of fraud and then attempts to cash in on the 
information.199 To reward such a plaintiff, said the court, would 
fly in the face of the FCA’s purpose.200  
Applying this analysis to McKenzie’s case, the court refused 
to find that McKenzie was an original source; her complaint was 
filed three years after identical allegations became public.201 
McKenzie was “not a ‘true whistleblower’ and [could not] benefit 
                                                                                                     
 195. See id. (“We reach this conclusion based on Congress’s purpose in 
amending the Act and the plain meaning of the Act.”).  
 196. See id. (“[J]urisdiction under the FCA had experienced two extremes: 
The original statute which allowed suits to proceed even though they had been 
copied from federal indictments, and the 1943 amendments to the Act, which 
precluded all suits in which the government already had knowledge of the 
fraud . . . .”).   
 197. See id. at 943 (“The interpretation . . . adopted by this Court today is 
consistent with this goal and ‘is most likely to bring “wrongdoing to light” since, 
by barring those who come forward only after public disclosure . . . it 
discourages persons with relevant information from remaining silent . . . .’”). 
 198. See id. (“At the same time, this approach furthers Congress’s second 
goal in amending the FCA: ‘[T]o prevent “parasitic” qui tam actions in which 
relators, rather than bringing to light independently discovered information of 
fraud, simply feed off of previous disclosures of government fraud.’”). 
 199. See id. (“Anyone who alerts the government and is a ‘true 
whistleblower’ deserves any reward that may be obtained by pursuing a qui tam 
action under the FCA. However, the individual who sits on the sidelines . . . 
should not be able to participate in any award.”). 
 200. See id. (“This would be contrary to the purpose of the statute.”).  
 201. See id. (“[I]t is clear that McKenzie is not an ‘original source.’ Her 
complaint was filed three years after Falsetti and well after the allegations in 
Dorris were made public. She was not the first to inform the government of the 
alleged fraud.”). 
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as if she were one.”202 Thus, the approach of the D.C. and Sixth 
Circuits, while not so restrictive as to require qui tam relators to 
be the source of any public disclosure, still required relators to 
inform the government before filing their actions and before the 
allegations became publicly disclosed.203 
D. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
In 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).204 While the 
PPACA’s health care provisions garnered much attention, the 
PPACA, in a much less publicized section, also altered the 
definition of original source under the FCA. The new definition, 
in context, reads as follows:  
(4)(A) The court shall dismiss an action or claim under this 
section, unless opposed by the Government, if substantially 
the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or 
claim were publicly disclosed—(i) in a Federal criminal, civil, 
or administrative hearing in which the Government or its 
agent is a party; (ii) in a congressional, Government 
Accountability Office, or other Federal report, hearing, audit, 
or investigation; or (iii) from the news media, unless the action 
is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the 
action is an original source of the information.  
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, “original source” means an 
individual who either (i) prior to a public disclosure under 
subsection (e)(4)(a), has voluntarily disclosed to the 
Government the information on which allegations or 
transactions in a claim are based, or (ii) who has knowledge 
that is independent of and materially adds to the publicly 
disclosed allegations or transactions, and who has voluntarily 
                                                                                                     
 202. Id. 
 203. See U.S. ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d 675, 
691 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that “[r]elator Findley cannot qualify as an 
‘original source’ because he had no knowledge of any of the essential elements of 
the publicly disclosed fraudulent transactions prior to their public disclosure”); 
U.S. ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 943 (6th Cir. 
1997) (holding that “the relator must provide the government with the 
information prior to any public disclosure”). 
 204. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (providing for reforms to the U.S. health care system). 
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provided the information to the Government before filing an 
action under this section.205 
The PPACA, then, changed the definition of the term original 
source to a relator who meets either prong of a dichotomy: (1) The 
relator has voluntarily disclosed his or her information to the 
government “prior to a public disclosure”; or (2) The relator has 
independent knowledge that “materially adds to the publicly 
disclosed allegations.”206 
Unfortunately, no legislative history for this portion of the 
PPACA is available, leaving courts to wonder as to Congress’s 
intent in changing the original source definition. Further, due to 
the recent passage of the Act, courts have had little time to 
consider the nuances of the new definition. The approximately 
eleven federal qui tam cases decided since the adoption of the Act 
either address different aspects of the changes207 or expressly 
decline to apply the changes because the PPACA made no 
mention of retroactivity.208 
The developments described above leave the courts with 
questions about how to interpret the new amendments to the 
FCA in light of how they have previously construed the statute. 
Unfortunately, the paucity of legislative history for the 2010 
amendments makes this task difficult. Though the 2010 
amendments contain ambiguities, it is clear that the new 
                                                                                                     
 205. Id. at 901–02 (emphasis added) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.A. 
§ 3730 (West 2011)). 
 206. Id. 
 207. See, e.g., United States v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 2d 773, 
781 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (noting “changes effected by the 2010 amendments to the 
FCA” relating to the “criminal, civil, or administrative hearing” element of the 
statute).  
 208. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood of Los Angeles, 392 F. App’x. 
524, 526 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that the parties “briefed these developments 
after argument, and they agree that the PPACA’s statutory amendments should 
not be applied retroactively to this case”); U.S. ex rel. Rosner v. WB/Stellar IP 
Owner, L.L.C., 739 F. Supp. 2d 396, 402 n.56 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that the 
Supreme Court held that “these amendments do not apply retroactively to cases 
pending at the time of the amendments”); U.S. ex rel. Dekort v. Integrated Coast 
Guard Sys., 705 F. Supp. 2d 519, 553 n.13 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (“Given that the 
legislation makes no mention of retroactivity, this Court . . . will ‘use the present 
tense in discussing the statute as it existed at the time the case was argued.’”); 
U.S. Dept. of Transp. ex rel. Arnold v. CMC Eng’g, 745 F. Supp. 2d 637, 643 n.5 
(W.D. Pa. 2010) (“The amendment was not made retroactive; therefore, the new 
statutory language will not be addressed.”). 
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language rejects the restrictive interpretation of the phrase 
original source adopted by the Second and Ninth Circuits. The 
new language makes no mention of a relator’s need to be a source 
to a disclosing entity, confirming the D.C. Circuit’s view that an 
original source need only be a source to the government.209 Under 
both prongs of the new definition of original source, the relator 
must simply “voluntarily disclose[] to the Government the 
information on which allegations or transactions in a claim are 
based.”210 This clarification is a positive change because the 
Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit approach would have restricted 
many potentially beneficial qui tam suits.211 A major goal of the 
1986 amendments was to find a balance between the extremes of 
the Marcus and Dean decisions,212 and the new language 
carefully avoids taking the restrictive approach of the Second and 
Ninth Circuits. In light of the three-way circuit split, if Congress 
had intended to give credence to this approach it could easily 
have defined an original source as a source to the disclosing 
entity; Congress’s refusal to do so is instructive.213 
It also seems clear that the “middle ground” approach 
articulated by the D.C. Circuit receives at least some favorable 
treatment: The first prong of the new definition states that an 
“‘original source’ means an individual who . . . prior to a public 
disclosure under subsection (e)(4)(a), has voluntarily disclosed to 
the Government the information on which allegations or 
                                                                                                     
 209. See U.S. ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d 675, 
690 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“Significantly, the statute only contemplates an ‘original 
source’ being a ‘source’ to the government.”).  
 210. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119, 901–02 (2010) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(B) 
(West 2011)). 
 211. See U.S. ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 27 
(1st Cir. 2009) (noting that “there . . . may arise situations when . . . the 
government would benefit from suits brought by relators with substantial 
information of government fraud even though the outlines of the fraud are in 
the public domain”).  
 212. See Findley, 105 F.3d at 680 (“After ricocheting between the . . . 
permissiveness that preceded the 1943 amendments and the extreme 
restrictiveness that followed, Congress . . . sought to achieve ‘the golden mean 
between adequate incentives for whistle-blowing insiders with genuinely 
valuable information and discouragement of opportunistic plaintiffs . . . .’”).  
 213. See supra text accompanying notes 136–41. 
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transactions in a claim are based . . . .”214 As noted previously, the 
D.C. Circuit in Findley read into the FCA a requirement that an 
original source provide the information to the government before 
the information becomes public.215 “Once the information has 
been publicly disclosed,” the D.C. Circuit reasoned, “there is little 
need for the incentive provided by a qui tam action.”216 The first 
prong of the new definition, in incorporating this requirement, 
takes a needed step in screening out parasitic litigation.  
It can be argued, however, that the definition’s second prong, 
which adds, “or . . . who has knowledge that is independent of and 
materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or 
transactions, and who has voluntarily provided the information to 
the Government before filing an action under this section,”217 is 
unclear and potentially weakens the positive step taken by the 
first prong. The next section will consider this ambiguity. 
IV. Combating Fraud Under the 2010 Amendments 
This Part will consider what remains unclear under the 
PPACA and how courts should proceed; specifically, this Part will 
look to the legislative history of the proposed False Claims 
Correction Act of 2009 for relevant indications of congressional 
intent.218 Next, this Part will review policy concerns undergirding 
the FCA’s mission and consider empirical studies of both federal 
and state qui tam actions.219 
                                                                                                     
 214. Id. (emphasis added).  
 215. See Findley, 105 F.3d at 691 (“[T]he only reading of the statute that 
accounts for . . . Congress’ decision to use the term ‘original source’ rather than 
simply incorporating subparagraph (B)’s description . . . is one that requires an 
original source to provide the information to the government prior to any public 
disclosure.”). 
 216. Id. 
 217. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119, 902 (2010) (emphasis added) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.A. 
§ 3730(e)(4)(B) (West 2011)). 
 218. See infra text accompanying notes 220–43 (discussing the bill’s 
legislative history). 
 219. See infra text accompanying notes 244–59 (discussing empirical 
evidence for frivolous qui tam actions). 
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A. Resolving Ambiguities 
While the first prong of the new definition laudably 
incorporates the D.C. and Sixth Circuit’s requirement that 
relators provide their information to the government before any 
public disclosure occurs, the definition’s second prong is unclear. 
The PPACA uses phrases like “independent [knowledge]” and 
“materially adds to” without defining these terms. Because of this 
lack of definition, as well as the scarcity of legislative history 
behind these provisions of the PPACA, it may be helpful to 
consider the history of the False Claims Correction Act of 2009 
(H.R. 1788)220 for guidance. H.R. 1788 is relevant because it 
represents the most recent window into the mind of Congress 
with regard to the FCA; from it we can discern the weight 
Congress places on avoiding parasitic litigation.  
Though H.R. 1788 was never enacted, the House Committee 
on the Judiciary compiled a Report on the bill.221 While the 
Report did not specifically address the “original source” exception, 
it did deal with the public disclosure bar.222 H.R. 1788’s 
supporters sought to clarify the FCA and strike the proper 
balance between incentivizing whistleblowers and discouraging 
parasitic lawsuits.223 The bill would have barred only actions 
where all the essential elements of the qui tam suit stem from a 
disclosure that has been “made on the public record or broadly 
disseminated to the general public.”224 Further, the bill would 
have allowed only the government, not defendants, to invoke the 
FCA’s public disclosure bar.225  
H.R. 1788 did not specifically address the original source 
controversy. Nevertheless, the Committee’s Report, particularly 
                                                                                                     
 220. See False Claims Act Correction Act of 2009, H.R. 1788, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (proposing amendments to the False Claims Act). 
 221. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-97 (2009) (reporting on the bill and 
recommending passage). 
 222. See id. at 14 (discussing proposed changes to the public disclosure bar). 
 223. See id. (“This clarifying language should return the meaning of the 
public disclosure bar to what Congress intended in the 1986 amendments, while 
still preventing truly parasitic suits.”).  
 224. Id. 
 225. See id. (noting that H.R. 1788 “provides that only the Government, and 
not a defendant, may move to dismiss an action based on the public disclosure 
bar”). 
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the dissenting views, is still helpful due to its discussion of 
parasitic lawsuits. The views of the bill’s opponents are useful 
because—since H.R. 1788 did not pass—these views ultimately 
carried the day. H.R. 1788’s opponents were concerned that the 
bill went too far in its goal of “streamlining” qui tam actions, and 
that while the bill contained useful elements, it also harbored 
significant problems.226 For instance, many of H.R. 1788’s 
provisions focused on helping private qui tam plaintiffs without 
necessarily benefiting U.S. taxpayers.227   
The bill’s opponents noted that increased litigation under the 
FCA would not necessarily lead to greater recoveries.228 
Particularly important is the fact that the United States 
government has declined to intervene in approximately 80% of 
qui tam actions.229 In fact, of “the $21.5 billion in FCA recoveries 
since 1986, only three percent was recovered in qui tam cases in 
which the Department of Justice declined to intervene.”230 To put 
it another way, weakening the public disclosure bar would not 
save the government any money but rather would only benefit 
opportunistic plaintiffs.231  
H.R. 1788’s opponents also pointed out that the increased 
burden on the courts and the Justice Department 
counterbalances plaintiffs’ interests in recovery under the FCA.232 
                                                                                                     
 226. See id. at 28 (“Although some of the provisions in this bill may be 
beneficial, other provisions are highly problematic.”).  
 227. See id. (noting that “the remaining sections of the bill are generally 
aimed at helping private qui tam plaintiffs and the qui tam plaintiffs’ bar 
without, in some instances, obvious benefits to the United States and the 
taxpayers”).   
 228. See id. (“What is more, it is entirely unclear that an increased number 
of qui tam cases will lead to increased recoveries under the FCA.” (emphasis 
added)).  
 229. See id. (“The Federal Government investigates every qui tam filing and 
has consistently declined to intervene in about 80% of the cases filed by private 
plaintiffs. This selectivity is indicative of genuine discernment.”).  
 230. Id. 
 231. See id. (“[I]t is suspect that the qui tam provisions in this bill will 
increase the Federal Government’s ability to recover taxpayer dollars. Rather, it 
is possible that these provisions will encourage private plaintiffs to file 
unfounded and parasitic lawsuits that benefit no one but the plaintiffs and their 
attorneys.”).  
 232. See id. (noting that “additional suits will add to the Justice 
Department’s burden and detract from its ability to focus on meaningful cases” 
and that “the qui tam provisions in this bill may, in fact, be counterproductive”).  
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The FCA is about balance between competing interests, and 
simply increasing the number and availability of qui tam actions 
does not necessarily strike this balance.233 Further, achieving the 
golden mean involves encouraging those whistleblowers with 
genuinely valuable information while discouraging those who 
have no significant information to contribute.234 The idea is to 
reward only those who “are truly deserving—whistleblowers who 
bring information regarding fraud to light.”235 The opponents of 
H.R. 1788 noted that the bill would essentially eviscerate the 
public disclosure bar.236 The Justice Department, in particular, 
expressed concern that plaintiffs with no direct knowledge of 
fraud would seek to cash in on FCA litigation while providing no 
real benefit to the government.237 Relators could take money 
away from taxpayers while contributing essentially nothing to the 
government’s case.238 
The Committee Report not only shows Congress and the 
Justice Department’s concern with preventing parasitic litigation, 
but the opponents’ language is highly persuasive and can readily 
be applied to the ambiguities in the 2010 amendments. Based on 
the need to strike the golden mean between incentivizing 
whistleblowers and preventing parasitic claims, and in light of 
the recent spate of unnecessary qui tam actions (as evinced by 
                                                                                                     
 233. See id. (“[The FCA] is about striking the proper balance between 
competing interests. The interests here are between allowing the United States 
to recover . . . [while] ensuring that innocent recipients . . . are not hauled into 
court . . . . We believe the FCA currently strikes that balance well.”).  
 234. See id. at 32 (noting a need to strike the “golden mean between 
adequate incentives for whistle-blowing insiders with genuinely valuable 
information and discouragement of opportunistic plaintiffs who have no 
significant information to contribute of their own” (citing U.S. ex rel. Springfield 
Terminal Rwy. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1994))). 
 235. Id. 
 236. See id. (“Despite the fact that the public disclosure bar has worked well 
since the 1986 amendments were adopted, H.R. 1788 would eviscerate the 
bar.”).  
 237. See id. (“According to the Justice Department, the bill ‘severely 
restricts the circumstances where the bar would apply in a way that would 
reward relators with no first hand knowledge and who do not add information 
beyond what is in the public domain . . . .’”). 
 238. See id. (“[I]f these changes were implemented, a relator could file suit 
and reduce the taxpayers’ recovery even though he or she has not contributed 
anything new to the Government’s case. The likely effect . . . will be to kill the 
[public disclosure] bar.”) (footnote omitted).  
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the Justice Department’s refusal to join 80% of the actions), 
courts should read the new language cautiously. The courts 
should view the new definition’s second prong as a narrow 
exception to the first prong’s requirements. The vague language 
independent knowledge and materially adds to should be 
understood to refer to a plaintiff’s knowledge of valuable 
information that substantially assists the government’s case. The 
new definition’s first prong already does much to prevent 
parasitic litigation by requiring relators to file suit prior to a 
public disclosure; this narrow view of the second prong would 
apply to cases in which the government has intervened and the 
relator’s information would substantially assist the government’s 
case. This interpretation harmonizes with Congress’s intent—as 
demonstrated by the opponents of H.R. 1788—to ease the burden 
on the Justice Department by allowing only those relators with 
the valuable knowledge needed to prove the government’s case.239 
Rather than clogging the courts with qui tam actions that merely 
parrot publicly disclosed allegations, the construction proposed 
above will strike the proper balance by (1) requiring most relators 
to file suit prior to any public disclosure and (2) allowing a select 
group of relators to file after a public disclosure only when their 
information substantially assists the government and the relators 
have voluntarily informed the government before filing suit.  
This approach would reject broader readings of the PPACA’s 
new original source definition. Such broader readings might, for 
instance, interpret the second prong’s requirement of knowledge 
that materially adds to allegations in the public domain as 
including any additional information leading to new allegations of 
fraud. Under such a construction, a qui tam relator could 
theoretically read about fraudulent activity in the New York 
Times, provide information to the government that technically 
“adds to” the allegations already made public, and share in any 
recovery even if the relator’s information did not substantially 
assist the prosecution of the wrongdoer or lead to a greater 
recovery. In such cases, the individual qui tam plaintiff, not 
necessarily the U.S. taxpayer, wins. In contrast, the narrow 
construction proposed above tracks the approach of H.R. 1788’s 
                                                                                                     
 239. See supra text accompanying note 238 (placing emphasis on the 
government’s case). 
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opponents by giving proper weight both to the need to promote 
qui tam actions that assist the government’s case and the 
urgency of screening out parasitic suits. Under this construction, 
the first prong of the original source definition would coincide 
with the position of the D.C. and Sixth Circuits (outlined in Part 
III), while the second prong would provide an exception, not 
addressed by these Circuits, for cases in which the qui tam 
relator has substantially useful knowledge and provides such 
knowledge to the government before filing suit. 
B. Policy Concerns 
The interpretation suggested above emphasizes the danger of 
parasitic qui tam actions, a danger for which there is increasing 
empirical evidence. Considering empirical evidence and social 
concerns, rather than focusing exclusively on legislative history, 
will prove beneficial; as the Third Circuit has noted, the FCA’s 
legislative history is complex enough that one can find support 
for just about any interpretation of the phrase original source.240 
It is more useful, the Third Circuit also pointed out, to focus on 
the original source provision’s overarching purpose, which is to 
“operate somewhere between the almost unrestrained 
permissiveness represented by the Marcus decision and the 
restrictiveness of the post-1943 cases.”241 The FCA’s goal has 
principally been to encourage the true whistleblower—the relator 
with firsthand knowledge who speaks up to prevent further 
fraud.242 As Richard Oparil observed, the FCA is just as 
concerned with deterring parasitic claims as with fostering 
productive suits.243 
                                                                                                     
 240. See U.S. ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1154 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (“The bill that eventuated in the 1986 amendments underwent 
substantial revisions during its legislative path. This provides ample 
opportunity to search the legislative history and find some support somewhere 
for almost any construction of the many ambiguous terms in the final version.”).  
 241. Id. (citation omitted). 
 242. See id. (“One theme recurring through the legislative history . . . is the 
intent to encourage persons with first-hand knowledge of fraudulent misconduct 
to report fraud. Congress sought to stop the ‘conspiracy of silence’ among 
employees of corporations engaging in fraud.”).  
 243. See Richard J. Oparil, The Coming Impact of the Amended False Claims 
Act, 22 AKRON L. REV. 525, 549 (1989) (noting that the 1986 amendments retain 
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Evidence of parasitic qui tam actions is alarming. One way to 
gauge this threat is to examine the rate of government 
intervention in qui tam actions. According to Department of 
Justice data, the Attorney General has not intervened in the 
majority of qui tam cases brought under the FCA. In fact, from 
1987 to 2010, the government has declined to intervene in 
approximately 78% of qui tam actions in which investigation is 
complete.244 While the conclusion that qui tam actions in which 
the Attorney General declines to intervene are likely to be 
frivolous involves an assumption, such an assumption does have 
support.245  
Further, data about the disposition of qui tam cases supports 
the idea that the number of frivolous suits is high.246 Just as 
there is reason to connect the Attorney General’s refusal to 
intervene in the vast majority of qui tam actions with a high level 
of opportunistic litigation, it is also reasonable to believe that 
there is a connection between dismissals and frivolous 
lawsuits.247 Of course, the mere discovery of frivolous suits is not 
dispositive, but it is “important because it indicates that qui tam 
actions result in some harm to the public—a waste of the time 
and money of the [United States] Attorney General’s Office.”248 
This high rate of dismissal “lends strong support to the 
                                                                                                     
the FCA’s “bias against parasitic lawsuits” and that the amendments “may 
deter individuals or entities from bringing a[n] FCA action if the purported 
fraud has been highly publicized”).  
 244. Fraud Statistics, supra note 18. As of September 30, 2010, out of a total 
7,201 qui tam actions filed since 1987, the government has intervened in 1,327 
actions and declined to intervene in 4,628 actions. The government was still 
investigating 1,246 actions. 
 245. See Christina Orsini Broderick, Note, Qui Tam Provisions and the 
Public Interest: An Empirical Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949, 971 (2007) 
(“Based on the above analysis, there is much support for the assumption that 
the Attorney General will intervene when a suit has merit.”).  
 246. See id. (“Data on the disposition of false claims actions also indicate 
that the number of frivolous suits is high.”). 
 247. See id. at 971–72 (“Just as it is reasonable to presume that if qui tam 
actions have merit the Attorney General will intervene, so too is it reasonable to 
presume that where they are frivolous the Attorney General will not intervene 
and they will ultimately be dismissed.”).  
 248. Id. at 972. 
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conclusion that qui tam statutes result in many frivolous 
claims.”249  
Professor Michael Rich also draws the conclusion that many 
qui tam actions are nonmeritorious,250 pointing out that each 
year thousands of frivolous qui tam actions are filed.251 Similarly, 
Professor Dayna Bowen Matthew notes concerns with 
opportunistic qui tam litigation.252 Professor Matthew highlights 
the hidden costs associated with qui tam suits: The relator’s 
action is not monitored and controlled as government prosecution 
would be, and this can have implications for the quality of the 
litigation.253 Attracted by the potential for monetary gain, some 
relators will pursue cases lacking factual support or solid legal 
theories; the result could be bad precedent and wasted public 
resources.254 Unlike the government, the private qui tam plaintiff 
is not compelled to consider the larger social costs associated with 
qui tam litigation, such as the impact of imposing defense costs 
on target companies.255 
                                                                                                     
 249. Id. at 975.  
 250. See generally Michael Rich, Prosecutorial Indiscretion: Encouraging the 
Department of Justice to Rein in Out of Control Qui Tam Litigation Under the 
Civil False Claims Act, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233 (2007–2008) (arguing for joint 
and several liability for attorneys’ fees under FCA litigation and proposing that 
courts require certification of novel legal theories in qui tam litigation).  
 251. See id. at 1264–65 (“The result is that the government does not dismiss, 
and relators are allowed to proceed with, thousands of non-meritorious qui tam 
[sic] suits.”). 
 252. See Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard Problem with 
Privatization of Public Enforcement: The Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 281, 337 (2007) (“Overenforcement by zealous ‘private 
attorneys general’ has been a concern for decades. The seminal literature on 
joint public-private enforcement abounds with examples.”). 
 253. See id. at 297 (“Privatization means the qui tam relator is not being 
effectively subordinated to the Government’s direction or supervision. This has 
impact on the quality of cases pursued, the number of cases pursued, and the 
strength of legal theories advanced when cases are pursued.”).  
 254. See id. (“Due to the sizable potential of financial gain, some qui tam 
relators will pursue cases with poor factual support or pursue flimsy legal 
theories that establish bad precedent and waste public resources.”).  
 255. See id. (“[T]he relator has neither an ethical nor financial interest 
compelling it to consider the impact of frivolously imposing defense costs on 
target companies. The Government, on the other hand, is expected to exercise 
prosecutorial discretion that takes into account what social goods might be 
sacrificed [by litigation].”).  
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A narrow reading of the new definition’s second prong, as 
discussed above, addresses these concerns by encouraging only 
select qui tam actions. In cases where allegations of fraud have 
been publicly disclosed, only relators who can substantially assist 
the government—not whistleblowers who remain silent until they 
smell a defendant’s blood in the water—may join in a recovery 
under the FCA. The concerns presented by Professors Rich and 
Matthew, including increased burdens on the Justice 
Department, taxpayers, and defendants, would be greatly 
diminished.  
What, then, is the upshot? The point is policy driven: Qui 
tam actions do not exist merely to reward relators for spotting 
fraud. Rather, the FCA’s mission is to reward those relators who 
alert the government to false claims and fraudulent schemes that 
the government would not otherwise have discovered.256 The 
social costs of qui tam litigation would outweigh its benefits were 
the government’s recovery to be reduced by qui tam relators who 
did not come forward until allegations of fraud became public 
(unless the relator’s information is extremely valuable).257 The 
FCA’s aim is to reward the kicker who kicks the game-winning 
field goal, not the second-stringer who runs onto the field to 
celebrate. To use a different metaphor, if the FCA’s mission is to 
incentivize the right kinds of whistleblowers—those who first 
blow the whistle—then there is “little point in rewarding a second 
toot” of the whistle.258 A whistleblower, after all “sounds the 
alarm; he does not echo it.”259 
                                                                                                     
 256. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-97, at 28 (2009) (“[I]t is suspect that the qui tam 
provisions in this bill will increase the Federal Government’s ability to recover 
taxpayer dollars. Rather, it is possible that these provisions will encourage 
private plaintiffs to file unfounded and parasitic lawsuits that benefit no one but 
the plaintiffs and their attorneys.”).  
 257. See id. at 32 (noting a need for a public disclosure bar that does not 
“reward relators with no first hand knowledge and who do not add information 
beyond what is in the public domain”). 
 258. Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1419 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 259. Id. 
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V. Conclusion 
The proliferation of whistleblower suits under the FCA is 
reminiscent of an episode of the series Arrested Development.260 
In the episode, Michael Bluth addresses the Board of the Bluth 
Company about honesty and whistleblowing.261 Michael dumps 
out a box of whistles on the boardroom table, stating that he 
wants an honest company—“a building full of whistleblowers.”262 
Unfortunately for Michael, the meeting turns into an eruption of 
needless whistleblowing.263 
The 2010 amendments to the FCA, if not construed 
cautiously, could lead to very similar (and much less comical) 
problems. Congress originally enacted the FCA to promote 
honesty among independent contractors, and when relators began 
to overenforce the FCA’s provisions, Congress stepped in to 
prevent such abuse.264 When this correction led to 
underenforcement and reduced recoveries for the government, 
Congress enacted the 1986 amendments in an effort to strike the 
crucial balance between proper qui tam actions and 
opportunism.265 The courts have wrestled with this golden mean 
ever since.266 Today, when the Attorney General’s office declines 
to put its seal of approval on the vast majority of qui tam actions, 
and when thousands of frivolous FCA actions are filed each 
year,267 it is important that Congress and the courts not forget 
that the FCA’s mission is not just to expose fraud but to save the 
government valuable resources. Using the approach outlined 
above will help strike the proper balance by requiring relators to 
                                                                                                     
 260. See Arrested Development: Whistler’s Mother (Fox television broadcast 
Apr. 4, 2004). 
 261. See id. (“He’s right; we don’t need a whistleblower. We need a building 
full of whistleblowers.”). 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. See supra text accompanying notes 11–78 (detailing the FCA’s 
background). 
 265. See supra text accompanying notes 79–89 (describing the 1986 
amendments). 
 266. See supra text accompanying notes 96–203 (discussing various judicial 
interpretations of the FCA’s “original source” provision). 
 267. See supra text accompanying notes 244–59 (discussing evidence for 
frivolous qui tam actions). 
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provide their information to the government prior to any public 
disclosure. Construing the second prong of the new definition as a 
narrow exception to the first prong will ensure that, in cases in 
which allegations of fraud are already public, only relators with 
information essential to the government’s case will be able to 
take advantage of the FCA’s provisions. 
